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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
BRYANT S. JACOBS and BARBARA 
T. JACOBS, his wife; DARRELL G. 
HAFEN and RAQUEL E. HAFEN, 
his wife; B.Y.U. EMPLOYEE FED-
ERAL CREDIT UNION; and ROAD-
RUNNER INN, INC., a corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
9949 
The respondent, in September, 1962, commenced an 
action in the District Court of Washington County to ex-
propriate, under the laws of eminent domain, property as 
to which the appellants owned or claimed an interest. Upon 
responsive pleadings being filed by appellants and stipula-
tions received acknowledging the right of the respondent 
to condemn, public necessity as well as proper design of 
the public improvement, a trial was had with respect to: 
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(a) Determination of legal interests of the ap-
pellants, respectively, in the condemned acreage; and 
(b) Evaluation of the condemned tract and com-
pensation to be paid for the acquisition. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The interests of the appellants having been adjudicated 
and the jury empaneled having returned to Court its special 
verdict, the Honorable C. Nelson Day, District Judge, on 
the 22nd day of April, 1963, entered judgment in favor of 
the appellants and against the respondent for the sum of 
$16,000.00, together with interest and costs. The appellants 
prosecute this appeal from that judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent, State of Utah, submits that the judg-
ment and determination of the lower court should be sus-
tained. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants' account of the record and facts in the lower 
Court is distorted and disjointed; in more than one instance, 
it has been made to appear that testimony, statements of 
counsel, and evidentiary rulings were unbroken when, in 
point of fact, each circumstance was foreign to the other 
in time and subject matter (see app. Brief, pp. 14 and 15, 
17, 18, 19, 20, and 21; and pp. 25, 26, 31, and 32). This 
"scissors and paste" job leaves such a breach in a full pre-
sentment of the proceedings that respondent deems it nec-
essary to capsulize the testimony and evidence bearing 
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upon the issues on appeal, disregarding the statement of 
appellants. 
Incident to the construction and development of the 
Interstate Highway System, the State of Utah, in Septem-
ber, 1962, filed a complaint in the District Court to con-
demn farm property located in Washington County be~ 
tween the towns of Middleton and Washington (R. 1-7), 
the land described in the complaint as Parcel No. 162A 
being a fraction of the Israel Neilson farm as originally 
constituted. The condemned tract comprised 33.33 acres 
and was wholly situate within an agricultural and grazing 
zone of Washington County (Ex. P-8, Tr. 376 Vol. C) and 
had so been for years prior thereto (Ex. P-8, Tr. 163 Vol. 
B); the acquisition by the public transgressed the larger 
Neilson parcel in a direction approximating northeast to 
southwest, the physical characteristics of the entire tract, 
prior to the taking, being displayed by the aerial photo-
graph introduced at the trial (Ex. P-3 and maps, R. 7-8). 
The design of the improvement called for the estab-
lishment of two 12' arterial traffic lanes in each direction 
(Tr. 76); in addition, a freeway-interchange was to be 
constructed on Parcel No. 162A providing for an ancillary 
network of exit and feeder "ramp" roads to and from the 
main channels of traffic, said interchange providing access 
to a frontage road to the north of the freeway proper and 
to "present" Highway 91 at the south (Tr. 75, 77-81, see 
aerial photo, Ex. P-3). Upon completion of the highway 
facility, the Neilson property will surround the interchange 
area at all points (Exs. 2 and 3). 
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Preliminarily to trial on issues of value, damages and 
compensation, interlocutory questions of title to residual 
lands and that under appropriation were determined (Tr. 
1-97, Vol. B). It was evidenced that: 
1. with respect to the total tract, Darrell Hafen, in 
June, 1960, entered into an option to purchase the 
same from Neilsen, et ux. (185.09 acres and water 
rights) for $100,000.00 payable $30,000.00 cash and 
$10,000.00 corporate stock down payment and the bal-
ance of $60,000.00 under contract (Exs. D-1, D-2, Tr. 
5, 27, 28, 29, Vol. B); 
2. it was agreed that upon exercise of the option, 
Hafen could select 40 of the 185.09 acres as to which 
title would be transferred upon advancement of the 
down payment (Tr. 6, 15, Vol. B, Exs. D-1 and D-2); 
3. at the time the option was executed, both Hafen 
and Neilson were aware of the then contemplated 
highway program, and that the same would necessi-
tate the purchase of a substantial portion of the 185.09 
acres (Tr. 32, 33, 67, Vol. B); 
4. in June, 1962, Hafen exercised the option by pay-
ment of $29,000.00 cash, a post-dated check of $1,-
000.00 and escrowed stock (Tr. 29, 37, Vol. B); 
5. Hafen selected 40 acres to be conveyed and on 
June 25, 1962 (barely 90 days before the condemnation 
action was instituted), Neilson, et ux., executed a war-
ranty deed running to Bryant S. Jacobs, one of Hafen's 
associates (Ex. P-1 p. 34, Tr. 29, 30); 
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6. of the 40 acres under the deed, 33.33 acres was a 
precise replica which the State of Utah, within 90 
days thereafter, was to condemn (Tr. 57, Vol. B, R. 
3, Ex. P-1 p. 34, 35, and 36); 
7. the description which Hafen utilized for the Neil-
son to Jacobs conveyance was secured from the Prop-
erty Acquisition Division of the State Highway De-
partment (Tr. 55, 56); 
8. Both Neilson and Hafen knew that the 40 acre 
conveyance was inclusive of the public right of way 
description (Tr. 32, 33, 94); 
9. the legal description of Parcel No. 162A and the 
Neilson-Jacobs deed is unique insomuch that it cuts 
angularly across section lines and requires that the 
tie be made at the center line of "present" Highway 91 
(Tr. 63, Vol. B, R. 3). 
Upon the evidence, the Court found that the option 
to purchase the 185.09 acres for $100,000.00 had been ex-
ercised in June, 1962, that a down payment had been made 
thereon approximating $30,000.00 to $40,000.00, and that 
Hafen, Jacobs and associates, at the date of condemnation, 
owned Parcel No. 162A with the residue under contract 
(R. 51-54, and supp. letter, R. 54-55). 
Subsequently at the trial on matters relating to eval-
uation, the appellants proposed to show contemplated and 
special plans for the use of the total tract including the 
condemned acreage, the proffer ranging from motel and 
subdivision sites to golf courses (Tr. 149, 150, 165, 196, Vol. 
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C). The Court, upon objection, denied the proffers (Tr. 62, 
151, 166, 198, Vol. C). As an ancillary feature, appellants 
attempted to prove a use of the subject property, at the 
date of condemnation, foreign and collaterial to actual 
usage or the legally pern1issible uses under the zoning or-
dinances then in effect in Washington County (Tr. 129, 
136); also, a proffer was made of alleged probable annexa-
tion of the subject property by the Town of Washington 
(Tr. 162, 163, Vol. C); the same was denied admission by 
the Court (Tr. 131, Vol. C). 
Appellants based their approach to value, thereafter, 
upon use of the condemned acreage for residential-farm 
purposes (Tr. 219, Vol. C, 1. 16-28). Their sole evaluation 
witness, Keipe, opinionated that the value of the expropri-
ated area, at the control date, was $67,000.00, or $2,000.00 
per acre (Tr. 209, Vol. C); the witness concluded that al-
though a partial taking was present, the residuary or re-
maining land had not been prejudiced by the acquisition of 
the 33.33 acres7 since the benefits flowing from the con-
struction of the public improvement more than offset any 
depreciating affect (Tr. 216-217, Vol. C). Neither Mr. 
Keipe nor the appellants, during their case in chief, elicited 
the sale of any properties deemed comparable to the sub-
ject acreage ( Tr. 112-246, Vol. C) . 
At the conclusion of appellants' case in chief, the State 
of Utah called as its first witness Mr. Higginson of the 
State Engineer's Office who testified concerning the spring 
sources of water appurtenant to the Neilson total tract 
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( Tr. ~52, Vol. C) and the places and purposes of use of 
said water under the Virgin River Decree of 1926 (Tr. 
256, 257, 258, Vol. C, Ex. D-6, Ent. 177, 178, 179) . In ad-
dition, Mr. Higginson testified as to the point of diversion 
and availability of water from Sand Hollow Creek on the 
condemned property (Tr. 258, Vol. C). As to the former, 
it was evidenced that the property under condemnation 
had available to it .69 c.f.s. of spring water for agricul-
tural usage only; as to the latter, the subject property was 
devoid of all sources of water from Sand Hollow Creek. 
Employees of the State Department of Health subse-
quently testified that a qualitative analysis had been made 
by that Department of the spring water appurtenant to 
the condemned acreage (Tr. 284, Vol. C) pursuant to the 
standards of the U. S. Public Health Service (Tr. 303, Vol. 
C) ; their findings revealed arsenic, chloride and sulfate 
contents to such an extent that the water was not suitable 
for culinary purposes ( Tr. 303, Vol. C) . 
Finally, State of Utah called three evaluation wit-
nesses, C. Francis Solomon, Jr., Edmund D. Cook and· 
Wallace Iverson; their opinions were uniform, that high-
est and best use of the subject property at the date of con-
demnation was for agricultural and related purposes (Tr. 
368, 313). Each witness testified as to comparable sales of 
neighboring property which they considered in gauging the 
fair market value of the property being acquired by the 
public authority (Tr. 314-319, 379, Vol. C). Respectively, 
their estimates of value were : 
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a. Solomon 
1. Value of 33.33 acres --------------------------$16,000.00 
($400-$600 per acre) 
2. Severance damage ---~-----------------------,------------None 
3. Total opinion --------------------------------------$16,000.00 
(Tr. 373-379, Vol. C) 
b. Cook 
1. Value of 33.33 acres --------------------------$13,332.00 
($400 per acre) · 
2. Severance damage ________________________________________ None 
Total Opinion --------------------------------------------$13,332.00 
(Tr. 312, Vol. C) 
c. Iverson 
1. Value of 33.33 acres --------------------------$10,666.00 
( $200-$400 per acre) 
2. Severance damage ______________________________________ None 
3. Total opinion --------------------------------------$10,666.00 
(Tr. 426-428, Vol. C) 
At the close of the evidence and upon motion by the 
State, the Court ruled that benefits, severance and conse-
quential damage were not an issue and would not be sub-
mitted to the jury (Tr. 434, Vol. C). On the 17th day of 
April, 1963 the panel of eight jurors returned into Court 
its answer to the special interrogatory by unanimous as-
sent: 
''1. What was the fair market value on Sep-
tember 20, 1962 of the tract of land sought to be 
condemned herein by the State of Utah containing 
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33 plus acres of land not including any water 
rights? 
"Answer: $16,000. 00." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT INSTRUCT 
THE JURY THAT THE PURCHASE PRICE OF 
THE NEILSON PROPERTY WAS IMMATER-
IAL. 
(A) The sale price for the 185.09 acres was received. 
(B) Appellants' attempt to say that the partial pay-
ment approximating $40,000.00 was, itself, a sale 
is not legitimate. 
A graphic illustration of the good faith which the ap-
pellants bring to this appeal is on display in Point II of 
their Brief (pp. 6-8). It is said that the testimony of 
Hafen in connection with the down payment of $40,000.00 
and the conveyance of 40 acres upon exercise of the op-
tion to purchase the 185.09 acres for $100,000.00 was, it-
self, a sale which should have been received on the issue of 
market value : 
"* * * The Court refused to permit de-
fendant-appellant, Roadrunner Inn to show the 
amount it had contracted to pay for the property. 
* * *" (App. Brief p. 4.) 
The intent of the appellants to portray the down payment 
as a sale was further shown by questions relating to down 
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payment, and the amount remaining due under the contract 
(pp. 115-121). 
This Court has in past times, made its position known 
relative to the admissibility of prior sales of the property 
under appraisement as. well as sales of comparable land. 
State V. Romer and Peterson, 12 U. 2d 317, 366 P. 2d 76 
(1961); Weber Basin Conservancy District v. Ward, 10 
U. 2d 29, 347 P. 2d 862 (1959); Southern Pacific Company 
V. Arthur, 10 U. 2d 306, 352 P. 2d 693 (1960); State of 
Utah v. Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 (1953). In Peek, 
it was declared that upon a proper foundation being laid, 
sales of property determined to be comparable were ad-
missible on direct examination as substantive evidence as 
well as on cross-examination for impeachment purposes. 
Southern Pacific Company v. Arthur again produced this 
result. In the Ward decision, the Court considered a prior 
sale of the condemned property and in so doing expressed 
an affirmative vote for the admissibility of the sale so 
long as it was related in point of time and market. Lastly, 
the Court, in State v. Peterson, held that the weight given 
to a sale once admitted, was a question for the trier of fact. 
See also Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. 5 # 21.3 p. 
417. The law of land damage cases is silent in support of 
the claim that a down payrnent on the purchase price of a 
particular tract (a conveyance of a portion thereof being 
made simultaneously) is in any event a sale warranting 
consideration as an endice of value. 
At one point in the trial, appellants' counsel allowed 
that, indeed, the alleged payment of $40,000.00 was but a 
partial payment: 
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"MR. FULLER: Your Honor, none of these 
questions relative to partial payment are designed 
to establish any price-
"THE COURT: All right. 
"MR. FULLER: -or anything that's been 
conveyed, so you will understand our position. 
"THE COURT: Yes." 
Set in this light, appellants' Point on appeal is void of effi-
cacy. 
There is small doubt that Hafen made an attempt to 
manufacture a sale, inclusive of the condemned tract, of 
40 acres for $40,000.00. Testimony makes it abundantly 
clear that the option of 1960 was executed at a time when 
the parties were aware of the eminency of the highway im-
provement across the Neilson farm, although unaware of 
its precise location; that the option (drawn by Hafen) 
permitted the latter, upon exercise, to select 40 acres for 
conveyance in consideration of the down payment of $40,-
000.00 or its equivalent; that the option was exercised 
within 90 days prior to the commencement of condemna-
tion proceedings and at a time when the Utah Highway 
Department was negotiating for the purchase of the 33.33 
acres; that upon exercise of the option, the landowner con-
veyed by deed the 40 acres selected by Hafen, 33.33 acres 
of which was a carbon copy of the State's right-of-way 
description; that Hafen obtained said description from the 
Utah Highway Department. The goal of this conspiracy 
of facts was the creation of an artificial land value; the 
effort was unrewarding in product. 
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The appellants cite a portion of the transcript to but. 
tress the assertion that the lower Court "instructed" the 
jury that the sale of the subject property was not material 
to the issues of market value (see App. Brief p. 7); the 
quotation is placed far from the setting and circumstances 
under which it was made. A quick glance at the testimony 
readily reveals that the statement of the Court was to the 
effect that so long as a contract was entered into for the 
purchase of the 185.09 acres between Hafen as a willing 
buyer and Neilson as a willing seller, that fact, alone, was 
germane to question of value and, therefore, the amount 
of the initial or down payment on the purchase price was 
neither material or relevant to the proceedings. 
On more than one occasion, the Court recognized the 
sale of the 185.09 acres. The transcript itself is a witness 
to this fact: 
"MR. FULLER : And who was the proposed 
seller under that option? 
"MR. HAFEN : Israel Neilson and Cattie Neil-
son were the proposed sellers. 
"MR. FULLER : And who was the proposed 
buyers? 
"MR. HAFEN: Myself. 
"* * * 
"MR. FULLER : Now pursuant to that con-
tract, did you undertake to commence purchasing 
all or part of the 185 acre tract of land? 
"MR. HAFEN : Yes, we did exercise this op-
tion. 
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"MR. FULLER : And up to-according to the 
contract, what was the total purchase price for the 
185 acres? 
"MR. HAFEN: $100,000.00." 
(Tr. 114, Vol. C) 
And on cross-examination of the State's witness, C. 
Francis Solomon, Jr. : 
"MR. FULLER: And that's what I am getting 
at. Do people ordinarily incur a purchase of $100,-
000.00 worth of property hoping to benefit from a 
highway that divides their property into three 
pieces? Has that been your experience? 
"MR. SOLOMON: No, but they do option it 
gambling on the hopes that maybe the highway will 
come through. And this was an option on a gamble 
and not binding the purchaser at the time of the 
option." 
The judgment of the lower Court should stand af-
firmed. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING AD-
MISSION OF FUTURE PLANS AND SCHEMES 
OF APPELLANTS. 
(A) Said plans are speculative, conjectural and per-
sonal, and bear no relationship to market value. 
Appellants allege as error the failure of the Court to 
admit in evidence plans and drawings for prospective and 
future use of the condemned property (App. Brief pp. 8-
12). Offered was the testimony of a golf course architect 
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who had proposed plans for "laying out a nine-hole golf 
course on the area," plans "for the development of motel 
units on the property, club house, and administration build-
ing" and the establishment of "lakes, a swimming pool and 
other facilities" (Tr. 166, Vol. C). At the date of evalua-
tion, the subject property was farm ground, had so been 
for 100 years or more, was zoned by the governing author-
ity for agricultural and grazing utilization and resided 
within an agricultural and grazing community. 
True enough, a portion of the condemned area passed 
through an acreage previously dedicated in subdivided lots 
known as the Whitehead Survey (Tr. 328, Vol. B, Ex. P-2); 
however, the dedication had taken place prior to 1875, and 
had been totally ignored thereafter. Its fruition as subdi-
vided property, therefore, was not exactly accelerated. It 
was in this setting that appellants made their proffer to 
show future plans and schemes. 
In this State, all property subject to condemnation, is 
to be evaluated at the control date, that is, the date of ser-
vice of Summons. State Road Commission v. Valentine, 10 
U. 2d 132, 349 P. 2d 321 (1960); 78-34-11, U. C. A. 1953. 
While actual use of the considered property is not neces-
sarily the only test of highest and best use (Shurtleff V. 
Salt Lake City, 96 Utah 21, 82 P. 2d 561) and the testi-
mony adduced must be within the boundaries of the reason-
ably foreseeable future ( ~Veber Basin Conservancy District 
v. Ward, 10 U. 2d 29, 347 P. 2d 862 (1959)), market value 
can not rest upon prospective and speculative develop-
ments. Olsen v. U. S., 292 U. S. 246, 54 S. Ct. 704, 78 L. 
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Ed. 1236; Hewitt v. New York, 118 A. D. 2d 1128, 239 N. 
Y. S. 2d 522 (1963). Orgel in his work on Valuation Un-
der Eminent Domain, Vol. 1, p. 152, # 31, makes the 
following analysis : 
"The courts have been at considerable pains to 
exclude from consideration those mere possibilities 
which they regard as so remote and unlikely that 
they could hardly enhance the price at which the 
property could have been sold down to the date of 
the tr·ial. * * *" (Emphasis ours.) 
Pipe dreams and personal schemes of the particular 
landowner have no association with market value or to that 
price which the willing and informed buyer and seller 
would agree upon. Tigar v. Mystic River Bridge Author-
ity, 329 Mass. 514, 109 N. E. 2d 148; Nichols on Eminent 
Domain, Vol. 4, p. 152, # 12.314 states the rule: 
"Evidence may be adduced showing only the 
naturally adapted uses of the property in its present 
condition. The owner's actual plans or hopes for 
the future are completely irrelevant. Such matters 
are regarded as too remote and speculative to merit 
consideration. * * *" (Emphasis ours.) 
Were the law otherwise, the personal plans and hopes of the 
owner, himself, would become the test of market value and 
the land would thereby be appraised for value to that per-
sonal landowner. Such test is alien to the universally ac-
cepted definition of market value (willing buyer and 
seller). Southern Pacific Company v. Arthur, 10 U. 2d 
306, 352 P. 2d 693 (1960); State v. Noble, 8 U. 2d 405, 335 
P. 2d 831 (1959). 
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Market value means a sale under ordinary and usual 
circumstances, Louisiana State Highway Commission v. 
Israel, 205 La. 669, 17 So. 2d- 914 (1944), and the proposi-
tion of the appellants for motel and related commercial 
development did not meet this standard. Its scope was 
speculative, conjectural, and hypothetical in the best form. 
Appellants cite to the Court Kennecott Copper Cor. 
poration v. Salt Lake County, 112 Utah 418, 215 P. 2d 933 
(1952) as authority for the argument that "special" plans 
of the landowner and special use is relevant on land evalu-
ation matters; it is set forth in their Brief (p. 11) that this 
Court in that decision made a specific statement in connec .. 
tion with "special purposes·' being considered. In actuality, 
the statement was not one from this Court but a phrase 
taken from 18 Am. Jur. 885, Eminent Domain, Sec. 247. 
What's more, is the fact that the quotation is deceitfully 
displayed in appellants' Brief in that sentences from the 
encyclopedia are drawn together out of context and without 
appropriate asterisk or paragraph designation (app. Brief 
pp. 11-12). A part of the paragraph which the appellants 
deleted in their commentary on "special" purposes follows: 
"While market value is always the ultimate test~ 
it occasionally happens that the property taken is of 
a class not commonly bought and sold, as a church 
or a college or a cemetery or the fee of a public 
street, or some other piece of property which may 
have an actual value to the owner, but which under 
ordinary conditions he would be unable to sell for 
an amount even approximating its real value. As 
market value presupposes a willing buyer, the usual 
test breaks down in such a case, and hence it is 
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sometimes said that such property has no market 
value. In one sense this is true; but it is certain 
that for that reason it cannot be taken for nothing. 
From the necessity of the case the value must be 
arrived at from the opinions of well-informed per-
sons, based upon the purposes for which the prop-
erty is suitable. This is not taking the 'value in use' 
to the owner as contradistinguished from the mar-
ket value. * * * The market value, and not 
the value for such special purpose or the value to 
the party seeking to condemn it, is the measure of 
damages. * * *" (Emphasis ours.) 
The facts of the Kennecott deciison are the distinguishing 
mark with the case at bar; therein, property, under assess-
ment by the County, had been utilized as a tailings dump 
and the plaintiff contended that that special use was de-
terminative as to value. The argument was rejected. 
This respondent has no quarrel with the holding of 
this Court in Salt Lake County, Cottonwood Sanitary Dis-
trict v. Toone, 11 U. 2d 232, 357 P. 2d 486 (1960), when 
offered for the express purpose as stated therein, i.e., sev-
erance damage. 
Prospective and future plans have, generally, been 
disregarded. In Redondo Beach School District of Los An-
geles County v. Flodine, 314 P. 2d 581 (Cal. 1957), the 
landowner attempted to prove future plans to develop the 
condemned property in a particular fashion. The Cali-
fornia Court, in denying permission of the same, com-
mented: 
"Coming to appellant's last contention, appar-
ently appellant attempted to subdivide the property 
in some way or other and ultimately to subdivide 
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all of it, but the usual rule in eminent domain pro-
ceedings is that a proposed plan for the develop-
ment of the property proposed to be taken is not 
material on the issue of market value." 
See also Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S., 282, 13 S. 
Ct. 361, 37 L. Ed. 170; Redwood City Elementary School 
District v. Gregorie, 276 P. 2d 78 (Cal. 1954). In a recent 
decision, Utah Road Commission v. Hansen, 14 U. 2d 305, 
383 P. 2d 917 ( 1963) this Court said : 
"* * * The valuation must be on the basis 
of what a willing purchaser would pay now and 
not what a number of purchasers might be induced 
to pay in the future for the land in small parcels. 
* * *" 
Point III of appellant's Brief has no foundation. 
POINT III. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN EX-
CLUDING EVIDENCE WITHOUT THE PERE-
PHERY OF THE USES TO WHICH THE PROP-
ERTY MIGHT HAVE BEEN APPLIED AT 
THE DATE OF CONDEMNATION. 
Finally, appellants argue that prejudicial error was 
committed in rejecting evidence bearing on highest and 
best use which was agnostic to the actual use or available 
uses under the zoning ordinances of Washington County. 
Although their selected quotations appear, again, out of 
the context and environment in which they arose (con-
temptuously suggesting the trial Court had stated the po-
sition of the State app. Brief 14, 15), it is readily stipu-
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lated that the Court was of a view that as to the condemned 
area, the perimeter of the testimony on highest and best 
use was governed by actual usage as well as that permis-
sible under the County zoning regulations. In an attempt 
to introduce plans of commercial and subdivision develop-
ment, appellants claimed that the zoning ordinances were 
inconsistent one with the other, that they were not in the 
public interest and were hence invalid (Tr. 163, Vol. B); 
further, that subsequent to the date of condemnation and 
prior to trial, the subject tract had been annexed to the 
Town of Washington (Tr. 163, Vol. B, app. Brief p. 17); 
and that a golf course architect was prohibited from pro-
jecting plans for the construction of a golf course on the 
subject properties as well as explaining the urgency of 
need for "a golf course in the St. George area" (app. Brief 
p. 26). 
As to the first specification above, it is not the land-
owners' province in a land damage suit to collaterally at-
tack the validity of a zoning ordinance. Robinson v. Comm. 
of Massachusetts, 141 N. E. 2d 727 (Mass. 1956); Long 
Beach City High School District v. Stewart, 30 Cal. 2d 
763, 185 P. 2d 585, 173 A. L. R. 249 (1947); 61 Harv. L. 
Rcc. 707 (1947). Counsel's statement that the zoning or-
dinances were not in the public interest because they were 
"very new in the county" fails all logic, for it is presumed 
that enacted legislation of recent origin had been consid-
ered in the light of recent property development, as opposed 
to zoning ordinances existent and unchanged over a period 
of several decades. On the second argument, no proffer 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
was made to show that any alleged annexation had oc-
curred pursuant to 10-3-1 U. C. A. 1953. Moreover, no 
portion of the land under condemnation was within or con-
tiguous to the Town of Washington at the date of condem-
nation (Ex. P-1). 
As to the third specification, the architect, Bell, was 
never qualified as a land economist, as a community de-
veloper, or as a real estate appraiser, broker or salesman 
(Tr. 197, 198, Vol. B); rather, Bell's qualifications ran 
solely to that of a golf course architect. As explained by 
appellants, the witness's function was to explain the plans 
of a proposed golf course on the subject property, respon-
dent's answer thereto being covered heretofore in Point 
II of this Brief. 
Section 78-34-11, U. C. A. 1953, keynotes any discus-
sion on the rule of law in this area : 
"For the purpose of . assessing compensation 
and damages, the right thereto shall be deemed to 
have accrued at the date of service of summons, 
and its actual value at that date shall be the mea-
sure of compensation for all property to be actually 
taken, and the basis of damages to property not 
actually taken, but injuriously affected, in all cases 
where such damages are allowed, as provided in the 
next preceding section. * * *" 
The mandate of the statute requires that the property 
be appraised in the light in which it was found at the date 
of service of summons, its amenities, advantages and short-
comings to be weighed as of that time. The evaluation pro-
ceeding is not the forum for speculative and. hypothetical 
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conditions, unrelated to fact, which may attach to the con-
demned premises months, years or decades after the date 
of condemnation. A wards based on speculation are sub-
ject to reversal. Williams v. City and County of Denver, 
363 P. 2d 171 (Colo. 1961). 
The great weight of authority sustains the principle 
that evaluation of property in land damage litigation must 
be within the circumference of legal and authorized uses. 
Reindollar ·v. Gaiser, 195 Md. 314, 73 A. 2d 493 ( 1950). 
In Long Beach City High School District v. Stewart, 30 
Cal. 2d 763, 185 P. 2d 585, 173 A. L. R. 249 (1947), the 
California Court said: 
"In other words, the general rule is that pres-
ent market value must ordinarily be determined by 
consideration only of the uses for which the land is 
adapted and for which it is available." 
In the early case of City of Seattle v. Byers, 54 Wash. 518, 
103 Pac. 791, it was held that the landowner could not, as 
a matter of law, prove that the existence of a "cul-de-sac" 
would be vacated at some indefinite time in the future; 
such evidence was regarded as speculative and without the 
realm of admissibility. 
The special commercial and residential uses advanced 
by appellants were, at the date of assessment, prohibited 
and unauthorized. Highest and best use in eminent domain 
is dependent upon a nomistic use of land; as said in Port 
of New York Authority v. Howell, 157 A. 2d 731 (N. J. 
1960) : 
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"The landowner is entitled to receive a fair 
price for any permitted use for which the land has 
a commercial value of its own in the immediate pre-
sent or in reasonable anticipation in the near fu-
ture. This concerns the market value, having a rea-
sonably anticipated, permitted use in view. The 
rule limits the proof to the value of the land as of 
the control date, i.e., the date of taking, in the con-
dition of the land at that time and to the uses to 
which it is naturally adapted and restricted. It ex-
cludes speculative and possible uses if improvements 
and changes were made. * * * 
"Buildings, trees, shrubs, topsoil, etc., under-
lying stone, sand and gravel are component parts of 
the land and are not to be valued separately apart 
from the land, but it may be shown to what extent 
the land is enhanced in value thereby, subject, of 
course, to the use restrictions imposed by valid local 
zoning regulations; citing authorities * * * " 
(Emphasis added.) 
No Foundation 
Appellants would have the instant case fit within an 
exception to the general rule, such being, that probability 
of rezoning may be shown. Each case cited by appellants 
requires a preliminary foundation of probability before the 
evidence can go to the trier of fact. See for example, 
People v. Donovan, 396 P. 2d 1 (Cal. 1962); Washington 
v. Motor Freight Terminals, Inc., 357 P. 2d 861 (Wash. 
1960). The Michigan Supreme Court, in Mackie, State 
Highway Comm. v. Eil~nder, 362 Mich. 697, 108 N. W. 2d 
755' (1961), cited by appellants, recognized the general 
rule: 
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u* * * We look at the value of the con-
demned land at the time of taking, not as of some 
future date. If the land is then zoned so as to ex-
clude more lucrative uses, such use is ordinarily im-
material in arriving at just compensation. * * *" 
In Mackir, a pending zoning change was under considera-
tion by the zoning authority at the date the property was 
condemned. No such element is associated with the subject 
property in Washington County. Even were it assumed 
that this Court would recognize the exception to the gen-
eral rule as stated herein, appellants wholly failed to lay 
a preliminary foundation showing the eminency of a zon-
ing change. In State v. Holt, 14 U. 2d 235, 381 P. 2d 724 
(1963), the Court found that the valuation of the property 
in question was governed by the zoning ordinance in affect 
at the date of condemnation and as in the instant situation, 
no foundation of probability was laid. Appellants' attempt 
to distinguish that decision from this case is uneventful. 
In Maynard v. City of N orthhampton, 157 Mass. 218, 
31 N. E. 1062, the proper basis for assessing compensation 
in eminent domain was recorded: 
"* * * In determining damages in a case 
of this kind, the jury should consider not only the 
value of the property taken, but also the affect of 
the taking upon that which is left; and in estimat-
ing the value of that which is taken, they may con-
sider all the uses to which it might properly have 
been applied if it had not been taken." (Emphasis 
added.) 
(A) Acceleration in land value estimates cannot, at 
law. be founded upon an unauthorized use. 
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Appellants assert that the proscribed uses involving 
plans for commercial and subdivision development entitle 
them to a higher consideration of value than that other-
wise found for agricultural purposes; that is to say specific-
ally, that permissible uses under the zoning ordinances or 
nonconforming use would not underpin a value of $2,000.00 
an acre while prospective and future commercial and resi-
dential plans would justify such conclusion. Appellants' 
own authorities deny them the relief which they seek. 
Sackman, author of Nichols on Eminent Domain (3rd Ed.), 
in a paper delivered before the Southwestern Legal Foun-
dation in April, 1963, said : 
"The proposition is, of course, fundamental 
that, insofar as existing zoning restrictions circum-
scribe the available uses to which the land may be 
devoted, they unquestionably affect the market 
value of the property. No evidence in support of 
an enhanced value may be admitted where suck 
value would be the result of a proscribed use." (Em-
phasis added.) Southwestern Legal Foundation In-
stitute on Eminent Domain, 1963, Mathew Bender 
and Co. 
To the same affect, see State of Arizona v. McMinn, 88 
Ariz. 261, 355 P. 2d 900 (1960), a decision cited by appel-
lants. The case made by the appellants at $2,000.00 an 
acre was as barren for supporting data as the land under 
appraisement and would have remained so, even had the 
speculative special uses been admitted. 
(B) Appellants' case was fully submitted on the 
basis that highest and best use was limited resi-
dential-small farm acreages. 
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When Keipe took the witness stand in behalf of the 
appellants, he was asked on direct examination to base his 
opinion on highest and best use for limited residential use 
in connection with small farm acreages (Tr. 219, Vol. B). 
Thereafter, Keipe testified that the subject property had 
a market value of $2,000.00 an acre, as of September 20, 
1962 for that use. Appellants now claim on appeal that 
I 
the condemned parcel could be best used for commercial 
and subdivision purposes. Appellants' theory is to say that 
property has more than one highest and best use; that if 
they are not able to get to the jury on one use, they may 
adopt a second use and thereafter raise as error on appeal 
the denial of the first. 
Appellants' have had their day in court; upon being 
advised of the Court's ruling relative to the exclusion of 
proposed commercial and subdivision evidence, they could 
have rested their case at that time and taken their appeal. 
In lieu thereof, appellants chose to have their evaluation 
witness attach a value to the property, the highest and 
best use being for a less intensified purpose. Their theory 
gives them two chances at bat, the first to go to the jury 
with the value of $2,000.00 an acre on the basis of limited 
residential use and second, that if the jury found the evi-
dence against them, to appeal on the basis of a different 
and inconsistent usage of the property. Their approach is 
reminiscent of a chameleon-and highest and best use for 
their purposes has been placated to serve momentary con-
venience. Appellants submitted their case to the Court 
and jury on a specific basis. They should not now be heard 
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to complain because the jury found the weight of evidence 
contrary to their position. Ray v. Consolidated Freight 
Ways, 4 U. 2d 137, 289 P. 2d 196 (1955). The rule of evi-
dence that a party may not allege as error on appeal testi-
mony which he, himself, fostered is well recognized: 
"As a general rule, a party is bound by uncon-
tradicted evidence produced by him to prove a par-
ticular fact or facts; and where he introduces a 
witness to testify on his behalf he ordinarily vouches 
for the credibility of his witness, and, in the absence 
of contradictory evidence, is bound by such testi-
mony, although the testimony was objected to by 
the adverse party. In accordance with this rule, a 
party who has introduced certain evidence cannot 
subsequently object that it should not have been 
received, * * *." 32 C. J. S. 1104, Evidence 
# 1040; Romero v. Turnell, 68 N. M. 362, 362 P. 
2d 515 (1961). (Emphasis added.) 
POINT IV. 
THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT OF THE 
LOWER COURT IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
GREAT WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE. 
(A) Appellants did not meet their Burden of Proof 
and Persuasion on Matters of Evaluation. 
Although the public agency stands before the Court as 
the plaintiff, on issues of evaluation and compensation the 
landowners carry the burden of going forward with the 
evidence, the burden of proof and the ultimate burden of 
persuasion. State Road Comm. v. Peterson, 12 U. 2d 317, 
366 P. 2d 76 (1961). Not only did appellants fall short 
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of these requirements, but the more believable testimony 
pointed to the case of the State. The lone evaluation witnss 
of appellants was outmatched by the credibility and sound-
ness that permeated the evidence presented by the trio of 
witnesses, Solomon, Cook, and Iverson, appearing for the 
respondent. 
It is fair to say that appellants were not penalized by 
the award of condemnation. Barely 90 days before the 
date of condemnation, Hafen agreed to purchase from Neil-
son for $100,000.00 under long term contract 185.09 acres 
and water rights appurtenant. Without disturbing the 
water flow, the judgment requires the State to pay to 
appellants $16,000.00 cash for the acquisition of 33.33 
acres of the larger unit. That the appellants are not en-
titled to profit on the condemnation transaction at the ex-
pense of the public was settled by this Court in State of 
Utah v. Tedesco, 4 U. 2d 248, 291 P. 2d 1028: 
"* * * A condemnee is not entitled to rea-
lize a profit on his property. It must go to the con-
demnor for its fair market value, as is, irrespective 
of any claimed value based on an aggregate of val-
ues of individual lots in a subdivision * * * " 
This Court is not prone to interfere with the finding 
of the trier of fact unless such is inconsistent with the 
manifest import of the evidence. Seybold v. Union Pac. 
R. Co., 121 Utah 61, 239 P. 2d 174; McCollum v. Clothier, 
121 Utah 311, 241 P. 2d 468. In reaching that verdict, the 
instructions by the trial Court to the panel were proper 
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and correct, the strength of this statement resting in the 
fact that appellants do not raise as error any instruction. 
Instruction No. 16, as given, was an accurate statement of 
the law relating to the zoning ordinances of Washington 
County at the date of assessment. 
CONCLUSION 
The accompanying drawing is illustrative of the land 
plottage incident to the trial of the matter. The basic sketch 
is evidentiary of the Neilson total tract prior to the date 
of expropriation as affected by "present" Highway 91. The 
property description (in brown color) on the first overlay 
represents the 40 acres selected by Hafen under the Neil-
son option of June, 1962. The second and last overlay 
(shown in green) displays the State right-of-way descrip-
tion which was incorporated into the condemnation com-
plaint filed in September, 1962. 
The trial of this matter resulted in a fair hearing to 
all parties. Appellants went to the jury with limited resi-
dential land use as the theory of their case and value based 
thereon; this was a decision of their own making, a choice 
made in litigation which cannot be now abandoned or re-
canted. 
Future plans and schemes for development by the ap-
pellants are personal to themselves, and have no place in 
a proceeding to determine market value. The unanimous 
opinion of the jury affixing market value met all the re-
quirements of "just compensation." 
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The judgment of the lower Court should be, by this 
Court, affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney General, 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR., 
Special Assistant 
Attorney General, 
C. F. WILLIAMS, 
Of Counsel, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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DEED CONVEYANCE FROM NEILSON PER 
HAFEN OPTION (JUNE 1962) 
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EXHIBIT 
MAP SHOWING THE PROPER 
TY OF ISRAEL NEILSON 
JR., ET AL a BRIANT S. 
JACOBS, ET AL AND THAT ' 
PORTION REQUIRED FOR 
HIGHWAY PURPOSES. 
PROJ ECT NO. 1-15-1(8)9 DATE 
SCALE 111 • 500' WASHINGTON CO. 
TOTAL TRACT 185.09 AC. 
LESS-LA NlfFOR H 1 G H WAv·---·--.. - -~- ... .. --- 3·3 :33·· Ac·::!:. 
C-ESS EX~fsf ROAD- US 
HiGHWAY ·sr·- - - 4.29 AC.-t 
EASEMENT · ----·--- ---- -- -- - - 6~14- Ac-~ . 
R"t:~MAINING LAND-147.33-Ac .± . 
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